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INTRODUCTION
Broadcasting regulation has been justiﬁed in many diﬀerent ways: econom-
ically, culturally and politically. Spectrum scarcity, economies of scale and
scope, or low elasticity of substitution with alternative services and products
can lead to monopolisation. Other sources of market failures are asymmet-
ric information and biases arising from advertiser ﬁnance, and the existence
of externalities, both positive and negative. Without intervention the broad-
casting market would fail to deliver the socially optimal mix of programmes.
While diﬀerent countries have shared a common conviction of the need
for broadcasting regulation, they have followed diverging policy approaches.
Such approaches have been largely dictated by national and political admin-
istrative traditions and have resulted in diﬀerent structures for the analogue
TV sector. Some authors, including Galperin (2004), think that it is import-
ant to analyse the structural features of the TV analogue sector as they con-
strain the implementation of the transition strategy to digital:
Individuals and organizations make long term commitments (i.e. investment in
particular broadcast technologies or services based on the existing rules of the
game). Because these commitments often represent sunk costs, these market
agents tend to resist policies that signiﬁcantly alter these rules. This facilitates
policy choice consistent with existing regime and inhibits those deﬂecting from
it (Galperin, 2004:18).
A shift from one regime to another is possible, but it requires mobiliza-
tion of large political resources and not many governments are able to resist
the political pressure of interests linked to the current structure of the TV
sector. Technology is only one of the factors that aﬀects the structure of
the TV industry and is not necessarily the most important. Therefore the
transition to digital TV very often follows a pattern determined by the pre-
existing structure of the terrestrial analogue sector. The transition to digital
TV in Italy lends support to the above hypothesis.
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This chapter has two aims. The ﬁrst is to show how the current features of
the Italian TV industry are the consequences of past regulatory interven-
tion. The second purpose is to analyse how the current structure of Italian
industry aﬀects the policies to promote the switch from analogue to digital
TV, and to consider whether these policies will be able to bring competition
to the Italian TV market.
DIGITAL TERRESTRIAL TV AND THE STRUCTURE
OF THE TV MARKET
Digital technology has revolutionised the telecommunications and the
information industries, but until recently its impact on the television indus-
try has been much weaker. However, there is a widespread belief that the
same forces that in recent years have radically changed the telecommuni-
cations and information technology will do the same for broadcasting,
where the pace of technological change has been much slower.
The transition to digital TV is much more advanced in satellite and in the
cable TV industry than in analogue terrestrial TV. Hence the structure of
the terrestrial industry will be transformed by the introduction and the
development of digital terrestrial television (DTT). The main characteris-
tics of DTT technology are as follows:
1. a much better movie picture quality and CD sound quality;
2. rapid delivery of a large amount of information and the possibility of
receiving personalised programmes and interactive services;
3. DTT allows better use of broadcast spectrum potentially, increasing its
availability to new broadcasters and providers of other information
and communication services;
4. DTT technology allows a single programme to be broadcast at a lower
cost and easier separation between network providers and content
providers; and
5. DTT allows the spread of conditional access systems, enabling broad-
casters to oﬀer a large package of digital products on a pay-TV or pay-
per-view basis.
The relaxation of spectrum scarcity should decrease barriers to entry and
therefore increase competition in the television market. The higher number
of channels should increase programme diﬀerentiation. Some authors (for
example Noam, 1998) think that commercial broadcasters would supply
high quality programmes provided the numbers of channels is large
enough. A market-based system cannot be expected to supply additional
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public interest programmes, as they would not be proﬁtable. There might be
an incentive to supply some specialised categories with a high content of
violence and pornography unlike conventional programming. For this
reason regulation of digital TV still seems to be required.
Another important eﬀect of DTT will be the reduced weight of the free-
to-air model vis-à-vis pay-TV and pay-per-view models. The increase in
the number of channels will reduce the average audience per channel and
competition could reduce the price of TV advertising. Therefore we
could expect proﬁts of free-to-air broadcasters to decrease. Total expendi-
ture by advertisers may well decrease as technology (for example personal
video recorders) allows customers to record TV programmes and skip the
advertising.
Another important factor that poses a threat to the free-to-air model
built on the 30-second spot that fetches a premium at prime time is the
changing policy of advertisers. Once an advertiser could reach most cus-
tomers with an advertising spot aired simultaneously on the main free-on-
air networks. Today this is much more diﬃcult. In developed countries the
mass market has atomised into market segments deﬁned not only by
demography, but by increasingly nuanced product preferences. The prolif-
eration of digital and wireless communication channels allows advertising
companies to reach speciﬁc market segments. It will be increasingly diﬃcult
for traditional networks to reach the same number of customers, when
there is increasing audience segmentation among diﬀerent platforms and
channels.
The evolution from mass to micro-marketing will probably lead to a
decline in the mass media’s share of advertising. Online advertising could
threaten the traditional advertising markets. The top portals could reach
truly mass audiences; the Internet is expanding, and banner ads could reach
a large number of specialised markets more easily than the old TV model.
It is highly probable that the Internet will increase its share of media adver-
tising expenditure, and commercial TV will decrease its share will decrease.
Pay TV and pay-per-view are therefore possible alternative revenue streams
for large TV networks. DTT with conditional access allows new methods
of payment to see an event. Prepaid cards placed in the decoder could be
used to see a single event (sport, ﬁlms and so on) without the need to sub-
scribe to speciﬁc channels.
In many markets the price mechanism plays the role of revealing infor-
mation about consumer preferences. In the free to air model the absence
of prices weaks the possibility to know precisely consumer preferences.
Direct charging mechanisms (as in pay-TV and pay per view) allows more
information about consumer valuations to be revealed and TV networks
could broadcast programmes more tailored to consumer preferences.
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DTT technology implementing pay-TV and pay per view decreases infor-
mation asymmetry between broadcasters and customers.
DTT technology has features that could generate more eﬃcient use of
spectrum, decreases in concentration, increases in pluralism and the intro-
duction of new innovative services. The question is whether market forces
alone will bring such results.
To answer such questions we must examine two diﬀerent aspects: concen-
tration and programme diﬀerentiation, and pluralism and social objectives.
Concentration and programme diﬀerentiation are economic problems.
Pluralismandsocialobjectivesarepoliticalproblems.Digital technologycan
increasecompetitionwithoutincreasingpluralismorachievingmoreimport-
ant social objectives. Because television is pervasive and powerful and has a
large inﬂuence on economic and political preferences of its audience, public
interestgroupshavearguedthatthetelevisionindustrymustremainregulated.
This chapter focuses on the economic aspects of TV regulation. It analy-
ses whether digital TV will decrease concentration and increase programme
diﬀerentiation with special reference to Italy. The transition strategy
adopted to switch from analogue to digital TV is very important both for
the success of the introduction of DTT, and for the strengthening of com-
petition in the market. It will take a number of years to convert fully to
DTT because today’s television sets are not designed to receive digital
signals. Therefore consumers must have an incentive to invest in new sets or
decoders. In order to provide DTT service, while continuing to broadcast
their analogue programmes, broadcasters may have to modify their trans-
mission towers and construct new ones. Broadcasters must also invest to
produce (or purchase) and distribute more digital programming. Such
investments are necessary to encourage consumers to invest in upgrading
their receivers or buy decoders. The diﬀusion of DTT can be seen as a
chicken and egg problem. If the installed base of TV sets capable of receiv-
ing DTT signals is negligible, broadcasters have no incentives to invest to
implement DTT. On the other hand, in the absence of content, consumers
have no incentive to make investments to see DTT programmes. In this situ-
ation government intervention could be necessary to co-ordinate network
operators, programmers, equipment manufacturers, and to give incentives
to consumers to buy decoders or new receivers.
But there are other important policies that could aﬀect market
concentration:
(a) the allocation of licences between incumbents and new entrants;
(b) the method used to allocate licences;
(c) the obligations imposed on broadcasters that acquire or purchase the
licences;
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(d) obligations to surrender analogue frequencies;
(e) the conditions for access to distribution networks; and
(f) the conditions for access to premium content.
Governments could choose strategies that have a diﬀerent mix of the
above policies. Such strategies will be the result of economic and political
pressure. Incumbents in the analogue TV market can be expected to ﬁght
to delay the introduction of digital TV or to dominate the new digital
market. In the transition period new DTT services and current analogue
programmes will be available simultaneously. Therefore the spectrum used
for analogue transmission will be unavailable, and additional broadcast
spectrum will be needed to introduce the new DTT services. Only at the end
of the transition period will incumbents be required to surrender frequen-
cies used for analogue transmission and only then might spectrum be avail-
able for new entrants.
If the allocation of licences is not designed to tilt the market in favour of
new entrants and restrain dominant operators, the incumbents will pre-
serve and eventually strengthen their position in the new digital market
compared with the analogue. The incumbent operators beneﬁt from key
assets such as distribution infrastructure (towers, frequencies, and so on),
content (sport and ﬁlm rights, and so on.); their image is based on an his-
torical presence in the market which could strengthen their market position
in the transition period (when there is still spectrum scarcity) and make
entry more diﬃcult when additional frequencies are available.
This is what probably will happen in the Italian case. Digitisation will not
necessarily produce convergence between Italy and other nations as
national industries adopt new technologies.1 Such convergence cannot be
taken for granted, and strong political and economic pressure is required
for it to be achieved.
THE EVOLUTION OF REGULATION IN ITALY 
UP TO 1990
Italy is a country that until 1974 had no private or commercial television.
Commercial television started in 1974 when the Constitutional Court deliv-
ered a judgment that a public monopoly of TV was not constitutional. In
1976 the Court delivered another judgment: public monopoly of TV was
constitutional at national level but local TV channels were free to enter the
market.
The government was also invited to regulate the spectrum assign-
ment and the number of licences, but it never intervened, and spectrum
The development of digital broadcasting in Italy 83
M384 – CAVE TEXT M/UP  10/4/06  1:21 PM  Page 83 Phil's G4 Phil's G4:Users:phil:Public: PHIL'S JO
allocation was determined by private broadcasters. As a result the number
of local TV channels greatly increased, and in 1981 another judgment by
the Constitutional Court opened the national market to private broadcast-
ers. During the 1980s there was no regulatory intervention to allocate spec-
trum and licences. As a consequence, the structural evolution of the
industry was left to the market. In the ﬁrst half of the 1980s the private
RTL SPA group (later called FININVEST) controlled three national tele-
vision channels, and was the only private broadcaster able to compete
with the RAI, the public broadcaster. In Italy in this period, the only inter-
est of government in TV regulation was the political control of public
broadcasting. Political pluralism in public broadcasting was regulated by a
Parliamentary Commission which showed control with opposition polit-
ical parties.
The results of this policy of the Italian Government were:
1. a very high concentration of the TV sector, with only one private
broadcaster competing with the public broadcaster (Table 5.1);
2. a very high number of local TV channels;
3. ineﬃciency in spectrum allocation (for example interference prob-
lems); and
4. no pay-TV broadcaster.
The fairly large number of national and local channels,2 the large number
of free channels, the high costs of cable distribution, and the ineﬃciency of
the local authorities in giving approval regarding digging, construction and
so on made the development of pay-TV unviable (on both cable and satel-
lite platforms). This constituted a great diﬀerence with other countries that
by 1980 had already experienced rapid development of satellite and cable
distribution.
ITALIAN BROADCASTING POLICY SINCE 1990
Italian broadcasting regulation changed at least formally after 1990.
Until that year the market had been regulated by judgments of the
Constitutional Court, without any active regulation by the Italian govern-
ment. The Constitutional Court describes the situation of the Italian tele-
vision market in this period as like the ‘Wild West’.
In 1990 Law 223/90 was approved. Its intent was to regulate the Italian
broadcasting market. It established media ownership limits that did not
diﬀer from those exhibited by the market structure in 1990. The number of
channels any company could own was three.
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The law also ﬁxed the total number of licences at national level (12). These
limits allowed the main private (MEDIASET) and the public (RAI) broad-
caster, to keep the number of channels they already had. There was no audi-
ence share rule, frequency share rule or advertising share rule. Therefore in
1990, RAI and MEDIASET shared the Italian broadcasting market. RAI,
the public service broadcaster, had 38.9 per cent of the frequencies, 50.5 per
cent of the audience and 29.7 per cent of advertising revenues: MEDIASET
had 45.8 per cent of the frequencies, 35.9 per cent of the audience, and 60.9
per cent of advertising resources. The Herﬁndhal index for the Italian
market was 0.333 in the case of frequencies, 0.384 for audiences, and 0.46
for the advertising market. The most peculiar aspect of the Italian broad-
casting market is the very high concentration in the frequencies market. In
a market typiﬁed by a limited spectrum, such as analogue broadcasting, a
high concentration of frequencies creates high barriers to entry and reduces
competition. This high rate of concentration in the frequencies was the
result of the 1975–1990 period when frequency assignments was not regu-
lated.3 Furthermore, as the Autorità Garante per la Concorrenza ed il
Mercato (AGCM),the Italian Antitrust Commission, has found (2004: 21),
RAI had an excess of frequencies relative to its needs and probably the same
is true for MEDIASET. This suggests that RAI and MEDIASET strategic-
ally bought frequencies in order to reduce the number of future entrants at
a national level. Table 5.1 shows that RAI and MEDIASET competitors
had, in 1990, only 19.8 per cent of total frequencies and probably an
eﬀective coverage of the total population of less than 40.5 per cent.
The high concentration of frequencies has led to a high concentration of
audiences and of advertising revenues. Broadcasters sell their audience and
part of their broadcasting time to advertisers. The larger the audience of a
particular TV channel, the more attractive the channel is for advertisers,
and the greater their willingness to pay for having advertising spots inserted
in the programme mix selected by that channel. Table 5.1 shows that this
strong correlation is found in the Italian television market, but that there is
no direct proportionality between the audience and the advertising share.
The public service broadcaster, RAI, had a much lower share of advertis-
ing than its share of audience, since there are restrictions on advertising
imposed on a public broadcaster than on private ones.4 On the other hand
the very small private companies, serving local markets, had lower adver-
tising market shares than their audience shares, since they were not attrac-
tive to the large advertising companies. In contrast MEDIASET and the
other, quite small, national broadcaster Cecchi Gori, had a higher share of
the advertising market in 1990 than of the audience market.
A new law, 240/97, was approved in 1997, under the centre-left govern-
ment. Its purpose was to increase competition in the Italian television
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market. Law 240 reduced ownership limits imposed on a single company.
The main eﬀect of the law, given the availability of 12 channels, was to
reduce from three to two the maximum number of channels that a single
company could broadcast. The private broadcaster MEDIASET was
aﬀected since it owned three channels.
Law 240 ﬁxed the ownership threshold at a share of 30 per cent of the
advertising market for a given sector (television, radio, newspaper indus-
try) or 20 per cent of total advertising revenues of television, radio and
newspapers combined if there were media’s cross-ownership.
Law 240 was the basis of regulation of the broadcasting industry made by
the Italian Communications Regulatory Authority (AGCOM) until 2004
(including Resolution 78 of 1998 on terrestrial analogue licences, and
Resolution 435 of 2001 on digital terrestrial broadcasting). However it
was never really implemented for judicial and political reasons; Silvio
Berlusconi, the head of the opposition till 2001, and subsequently head of
the Italian government, was the owner of MEDIASET.
Thus if we compare the structure of analogue television industry in 1990
with that in 2002 we see no decrease in the rate of concentration. There was
in fact an increase in the Herﬁndhal index for frequencies, audience and
advertising. The largest increase (from 0.46 to 0.475) was in the advertising
market whose index increased. The public broadcaster RAI, the second
private broadcaster Telecom, and local broadcasters had falling shares of
the advertising market; only the private broadcaster MEDIASET increased
its share. Probably this was due to MEDIASET’s good performance in
gaining audiences: its share increased from 35.9 per cent in 1990 to 42.6
per cent in 2002. In Italy unlike other European countries, the weight in
the terrestrial analogue market of the two main broadcasters, RAI and
MEDIASET, is not challenged by other platforms. Cable TV is represented
by a small company FASTWEB, with less than 200 000 subscribers. There
is stiﬀer competition for audiences coming from the digital satellite plat-
form. The signiﬁcance of this platform (see the following section) has
increased in recent years but it is still too small to challenge the oligopoly
in the terrestrial analogue market.
PROBLEMS AND OBSTACLES TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE PAY-TV MARKET IN ITALY
The pay-TV market in Italy started in 1994, when Telepiù, belonging to the
French group Canal Plus, began to broadcast analogue satellite pay-TV.
Development of pay-TV has been highly dependent on access to live rights
to soccer and other sports. Initially subscribers could see a ‘live’ football
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match on Sunday evening. In 1997 Telepiù went digital. Thus it had the
ability to broadcast soccer matches simultaneously. Live sports rights
became the key to the success of digital pay-TV, as only subscribers could
see key sport events. Since Telepiù could pass its programming costs on to
a self-selected audience, it was able to make a higher bid than free-to-air
broadcasters for sports rights, thereby increasing the incentives for dedi-
cated fans to subscribe to its services.5 In 1998 Stream, a company created
in 1993 by Stet SPA, a state-run company, to oﬀer interactive media services
(video on demand, pay per view, and so on), entered the digital pay-TV
market. Until 1997 Stream had been controlled by Telecom Italia owned by
Stet; and Laws 223/90 and 224/97 did not allow a public sector company,
other than RAI, to broadcast its own programmes. Therefore Stream was
a service provider that carried on cable the signal for channels and pro-
grammes produced by third parties. In 1998 Telecom was privatised and
therefore Stream, initially a cable company, had the possibility to oﬀer a
pay-TV service, or both with satellite and cable platforms. In 1999 News
Corporation became a minority shareholder (17 per cent) of Stream.
The entry of Stream on to the pay-TV market led to a bidding war with
Telepiù for sports rights. In order to protect the weaker company (Stream)
from being excluded from broadcasting the main soccer events, the regu-
lator restricted to 60 per cent the share of exclusive live rights to Serie A
(Premier League) soccer matches that a single company could acquire (Law
78/1999). Therefore Telepiù and Stream shared the sport-rights market,
Telepiù having the exclusive live rights of northern Italian clubs (whose
audience was distributed throughout Italy) – Juventus, Milan and Inter –
and Stream having the rights on popular clubs, though with fewer fans,
such as Parma, Fiorentina, Roma and Lazio. The competition for football
rights increased their prices steadily. The estimated prices paid for football
rights in Italy rose ﬁve fold between 1998/1999 and 1999/2000.6 After that
period the increase was much lower (8.5 per cent between 1999/2000 and
2000/2001). In this period we do not ﬁnd a similar increase in the number
of subscribers and revenues of pay-TV companies.
The growth of subscribers accelerated from 20 per cent in 1997 to 29
per cent in 1998, and to 52 per cent in 1999. In 1999 the number of subscribers
was 1.7 million (Table 5.2). The reason that the number of subscribers was
much lower than in other countries were competition in a free-to-air sector
that oﬀered a large choice of channels, even if the quality was not very high,
and the widespread diﬀusion of pirated cards for decoders.
On the other hand, competition between Stream and Telepiù did not allow
a substantial increase in the subscription price. Hence the increase in costs
of sports rights had a negative impact on the proﬁts of pay-TV companies.
In 2000 Stream had an average revenue per subscriber of 158.3 euros; the cost
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of sports rights per subscriber was 307 euros. Stream’s losses were 359.9
million euros in 2000 and 484.6 in 2001.Telepiù had an average revenue per
subscriber of 348.7 euros and an average cost of sport rights per subscriber
equal to 198.4. Telepiù’s losses were 429.9 million euros in 2000 and 344.5
million in 2001. As most pay-TV costs are ﬁxed costs, a small number of sub-
scribers does not allow companies to recover costs.
It is very likely that the cause of ﬁnancial diﬃculties of pay-TV com-
panies in Italy was the limited size of the market rather than the cost of
sport rights. We do not have data on sports rights costs only for Pay TV but
we know (Table 5.3) that the value of sports rights for the total TV sector
in Italy, on a per subscriber basis, is about average of that of other
European countries.
Telepiù’s and Stream’s ﬁnancial diﬃculties pushed the former in 2002
to buy Stream. A reduction of competition and increase in the number of
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Table 5.2 The number of subscribers to pay-TV in Italy
Companies 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Tele  a 770 173 927 181 1 113 792 1 354 876 1 557 991
Stream – – 89 373 385 640 668 568
Total 770 173 927 181 1 203 142 1 740 516 2 226 559
Note: a The TELE subscribers for 1997, 1998 and 1999 include cable subscribers who
numbered 2180 in 1997, 3141 in 1998 and at 30/9/99, 3508.
Source: AGCM, case No. 8386, Stream-Telepiù, and case No. 10716 Group Canal-Stream.
Table 5.3 Estimated value of sports rights (millions of euros) (soccer and
other sports)
2000 2001 2002 2003 Value of rights
purchased per
subscriber
Germany 1105 1235 1470 1300 35.8
United Kingdom 1035 1145 1345 1180 48.16
Italy 670 720 830 725 33.72
France 535 580 655 570 23.17
Spain 325 350 390 340 25.35
Source: AGCOM Report 2003 p. 73. The value of rights per subscriber was computed by
dividing the value of sports rights by the number of households with TV.
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subscribers were seen as a possible remedy to Telepiù’s ﬁnancial problems.
This acquisition was allowed by the Italian antitrust authority (AGCM) in
2002. The AGCM placed some obligations on Telepiù to reduce the possi-
bility that the broadcaster could exploit its monopoly position in the pay-
TV market. In 2002 negotiations began, between Sky and Canal Plus, for
the acquisition of Telepiù. The transaction was settled in April 2003. Sky
was obliged by AGCM and by the EU Commission to give other operators
access to its platform and to its content. The access price was based on retail
minus principle.7 Sky was also obliged to waive exclusive rights on football
matches and ﬁlms on platforms others than Direct to Home (DTH). The
aim of this obligation was to ensure that sporting events, one of the key
drivers of digital pay-TV television. would not be available exclusively.
The entry of Sky on the pay TV market aﬀected the number of sub-
scribers and the subscription price. Revenue per subscriber increased by
20 per cent in 2003 over 2002, and the number of subscribers increased by
11 per cent over 2001. Therefore Sky revenues increased by 33 per cent in
2003 over 2001. In 2004 the number of subscribers to Sky increased and by
the end of November it reached 2.7 million. In the meantime in Italy, as in
other European countries, there was a decrease in the price of sports TV
rights that beneﬁted Sky’s balance sheet.
The entry of Sky led to a monopoly in the pay-TV market but strength-
ened competition across the whole Italian TV market as a whole.
Negotiations for access to content began with the cable operator Fastweb
and for access to the platform with the sports producer Gioco Calcio (an
association of football teams). These two parties were quite weak8 and there-
fore their impact on the structure of the pay-TV industry was negligible.
With the introduction of DTT in 2004, stronger competitors –
MEDIASET and TV7 – entered the pay-per-view market. For 110 million
euros MEDIASET bought exclusive DTT rights to cover the soccer
matches of Juventus, AC Milan and Inter (the teams with the largest fol-
lowing in Serie A) for the next three years. For 32 million euros TV7 bought
exclusive DTT rights to cover the soccer matches of central and southern
Italian teams (Fiorentina, Roma, Bologna, and so on). These prices are
much lower than those paid by Sky to football clubs for exclusive DTH
rights – 400 million euros for one year. The lower prices allow MEDIASET
and TV7 to sell prepaid cards at a very reasonable price (three euros per
MEDIASET event and two euros for TV7).9
In the short run the impact of the entry of this new competitor in the pay-
per-view market is surely positive, since it allows consumers who are not Sky
subscribers to see events that they would not otherwise see. Total welfare
increases because a larger market is served. In the long run, if the eﬀect of
MEDIASET’s entry in the pay-per-view market is to decrease the growth
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rate of subscribers to Sky, the eﬀect on competition between platforms will
not necessarily be positive. In Italy, competition between platforms is much
weaker than in other industrialised countries and hence events that weaken
such competition are not positive. This point will be analysed in the sections
below in the context of the eﬀect of digitalisation on competition in the
Italian TV market.
ITALY’S TRANSITION STRATEGY AND
FREQUENCY ASSIGNMENT POLICY
Governments have adopted diﬀerent transition strategies from analogue to
digital terrestrial TV that vary considerably in their priorities, instruments
and timing. Such policies create diﬀerent rules of the game for the reorgan-
isation of the sector. One of the most important aspects of these policies is
the question of licensing. In the United States the US Congress authorised
the distribution of additional broadcast spectrum to each TV broadcaster
so that the new DTT service could be introduced while simultaneously con-
tinuing with current analogue broadcasts. In Britain only the BBC received
sole control of a DTT multiplex. The other incumbents were instead forced
to share capacity on two other multiplexes. Room was also made for licens-
ing new operators. The US strategy made a clear choice to guarantee the
survival of free local TV, privileging incumbent local stations in the alloca-
tion of DTT licences. The goal has been to extend the organisation of the
industry around small local oligopolies in the digital era. In Britain the
strategy was designed to change the structure of the industry in favour of
new entrants and restrain dominant operators. In Italy the strategy has
privileged continuity over reform. The transition strategy adopted is such
that the industry’s structure in analogue TV will not change in the digital
world. Migration from analogue to digital will be led by the two main
market incumbents despite the cost in terms of forgone spectrum
eﬃciencies and media access.
Italian governments have often stated that the switch from analogue to
digital TV will increase the number of channels at regional and national
level. This is true if we consider the number of licences that will be allocated
at the end of the transition period, which is scheduled for the year 2006.10
The Italian frequencies Plan (statement of AGCOM no. 15/03/CONS) has
resolved on 18 multiplexes for the digital TV services, twelve SFNs (single
frequency networks) and six MFNs (multi-frequency networks) that allow
regional variations. Each multiplex could carry at least three digital chan-
nels of the same quality and coverage as the current analogue channels.
Thus, at the end of the transition period it will be possible to have at least
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54 channels with a coverage of 80 per cent of the territory and 90 per cent
of the population. These channels will use much less spectrum than used
by analogue channels. At the end of the transition period competition in
the TV digital sector will no longer be restrained by spectrum scarcity.
There are two large obstacles that must be overcome to attain true com-
petition for TV digital services. The ﬁrst is that, as shown, in Table 5.1, the
two main incumbents (RAI and MEDIASET) have 80 per cent of the
towers and frequencies in the Italian analogue market. These two com-
panies, when the switch to digital is complete, will need between 10 and 20
per cent of such frequencies to provide the same number and quality of
programmes with DTT as they broadcast today. Therefore MEDIASET
and RAI should surrender frequencies, although past experience shows
that Italian governments have been ineﬀective at obtaining the surrender of
frequencies when the law required it (that is Law 249/97). The second obst-
acle is the strategy adopted by Italy to implement digital TV. The 1998 fre-
quencies plan approved by AGCOM freed up four frequencies to launch
four digital terrestrial channels that would allow nationwide coverage.
However, a diﬀerent strategy was chosen with the creation of network
providers that are in charge of the multiplexes.
Multiplexes were oﬀered to applicants who could obtain the licence to be
a network provider, but no broadcast spectrum was allocated to them.
Therefore the network provider could use frequencies already owned, if it
were an existing terrestrial broadcaster, or it could buy frequencies on the
market. Most of the frequencies available on the market were those owned
by the hundreds of local TV channels, many of which had ﬁnancial
diﬃculties. They found it more proﬁtable to sell towers and frequencies than
to make investments to implement digital TV on the local market. Existing
terrestrial broadcasting also needed to buy frequencies to introduce the new
DTT service while simultaneously continuing with their current analogue
broadcasts. The lack of a plan in 1975–1990 to assign frequencies to users
has resulted in a highly ineﬃcient allocation of the spectrum (with inter-
ference problems) that continues today. In some sites existing terrestrial
broadcasters have excess capacity and have no need to buy frequencies to
oﬀer both the new DTT service and analogue programmes. Act no. 13137
of the Italian antitrust (AGCM) hypothesised that RAI, with 90 plants and
frequencies in excess of the needs11 could oﬀer a potential coverage of
digital services to 74 per cent of the population. RAI with another 459
plants in excess could oﬀer eﬀective coverage of 70 per cent of the popula-
tion. However, the same Act responded favourably to the purchase of extra
plant and frequencies by the RAI. A similar hypothesis of excess capacity
was made in respect of MEDIASET, but in this case too AGCM authorised
the acquisition of new frequencies and towers. The problem is that in some
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places there is no excess capacity and even large broadcasters must buy fre-
quencies to cover them.
To date, ﬁve DTT multiplexes have been licensed, all to existing terres-
trial broadcasters: the RAI has two multiplexes, MEDIASET has one,
Telecom Italia has one, and Holland Co-ordinator, which has ﬁnancial
links with MEDIASET, also obtained one. The government hypothesis is
that by 2006 there will be four or ﬁve multiplexes that will cover 70 or 80
per cent of households. The ﬁrst goal of Law 112/04 has already been
reached: by the end of 2004 the DTT RAI trials had covered 50 per cent of
the population. One of the RAI multiplexes will allow national coverage
without regional variation (SFN). Obviously, the Italian government strat-
egy does not encourage the entry of new competitors on the network
providers market, as Table 5.4 shows.
ITALY’S REGULATORY RESPONSE TO VERTICAL
INTEGRATION IN THE DTT MARKET
Law 66/2001 and the subsequent media laws tried to shape the market
structure of the DTT television industry (see Art. 5 of Law 112/2004).
The laws identify three kinds of TV operators: the network provider, the
content provider and the operator that provides administrative and tech-
nical services for digital TV including conditional access and a subscription
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Table 5.4 Degree of coverage and market structure of TV platforms in
2004 in Italy
Platform Coverage Market structure
Terrestrial analogue 99% of the population Collective dominance
by two oligopolists
Satellite analogue 100% of the population Monopoly
(theoretical)
Satellite digital Large metropolitan areas Monopoly
Cable In theory, 80% of telephone Monopoly
lines
ADSL Dominant oligopoly
with a market share
higher than 80%
DTT 50% of the population Four groups own ﬁve
multiplexes
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management system. There is a need of diﬀerent licences to operate in
cable, satellite, DTT platforms. Furthermore in DTT platform there is a
need of a licence for each stage of the TV vertical chain. In the two other
platforms, cable and satellite is enough for only one licence. The network
provider owns the network infrastructure and supplies broadcast transmis-
sion capacity. The content provider ensures the provision of programmes.
Granting a licence does not imply an assignment of frequencies, which
AGCOM will do by a diﬀerent administrative act. The previous section
explained how frequencies are actually assigned. At least in the transition
period, the chances of a newcomer operating as a network provider are very
low due to spectrum scarcity. Hence the market for the DTT platform
downstream of network providers will be dominated by few ﬁrms: the
incumbents in the TV analogue market. Two of these companies, RAI and
MEDIASET, already dominate this market. Theory suggests that vertical
integration may be used to facilitate the strategic practice of exclusionary
behaviour. An integrated ﬁrm could deny a rival access to necessary inputs
for the purpose of gaining or maintaining monopoly power. Vertical inte-
gration can raise prices of intermediate and ﬁnal goods and harm con-
sumer welfare. In programming and distribution in the TV industry,
vertical integration could have these eﬀects. Law 112/2004 implicitly recog-
nises the possibility of the practice of market foreclosure and obliges
network providers to fulﬁl the following requirements:
(a) network providers must provide open access to their platform on fair,
reasonable and non-discriminatory terms;
(b) network providers using a digital terrestrial platform are required to
oﬀer 40 per cent of their capacity to companies not owned by the
owner of the network provider;
(c) network providers integrated upstream in the production and pro-
gramming of contents (where the network provider and content
provider are vertically integrated) must establish separate companies,
even if they could continue to have the same ownership. This require-
ment does not hold for cable and satellite TV companies.
Furthermore, Law 112/2004 requires that all companies in the digital com-
munication TV services industry have separate accounting for the diﬀerent
services they produce.
Requirements for companies that are only in the upstream market (the
provision and production of content) are weaker than those for companies
in the downstream market. Content providers are required to oﬀer access
to content at market prices and non-discriminatory terms (art. 5f). This
requirement does not apply if the rights are exclusive.
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The above requirements increase transparency and could allow the
regulator and the antitrust authority to improve their ability to verify the
existence of anticompetitive practices (exorbitant ﬁnal and access prices,
discrimination against an upstream company, and so on). On the other
hand, Law 112 allows vertical integration between programming and dis-
tribution. We could expect vertically integrated ﬁrms to follow the strategic
practice of market foreclosure. Chipty (2001) examines the vertical rela-
tionship between programming and distribution in the US cable TV indus-
try.12 The paper provides systematic evidence that integration does result in
some degree of market foreclosure.
Hence the above obligations do not seem adequate to ensure develop-
ment, in Italy, of a competitive DTT market. They are weaker than those
imposed on incumbents in the telecommunications sector. Only the obli-
gation on vertically integrated ﬁrms to establish two diﬀerent companies
for upstream and downstream markets is not applied to dominant telecom-
munications operators.
In Italy there are two vertically integrated companies RAI and MEDI-
ASET that are dominant in the analogue TV market. In the transition
period, extra spectrum is not available for new competitors, and infrastruc-
tures used in the analogue market could be used to become a network
provider, with a modest amount of investment. The two companies also
have enough money to develop new content for the digital market. We could
expect these two companies to use their dominant position in the analogue
TV service market, and in the network provider digital market, to seek to
exclude new content providers.
However, Laws 66 and 112 state that each network provider must assign
40 per cent of its capacity for DTT trial to other broadcasters. This rule,
according to the Italian government, will allow an increase in competition
in the content providers’ market. This rule cannot be substantially enforced
when a company has strong commercial links with other companies in the
national and international TV market. Two MEDIASET channels are
broadcast in the digital trial by the network provider Holland Co-ordinator.
The antitrust authority (AGCM) in a recent act (No. 13770, 16 November
2004) observed that a large obstacle to competition in the TV advertising
market is the great inﬂuence of Fininvest on the other private incumbents
Telecom Italia and Holland Co-ordinator.
Our conclusion is that the Italian media laws are inadequate to increase
competition in the digital service markets. The goal of achieving a genuinely
competitive market can be achieved only with ownership separation between
network and content providers at least for digital terrestrial television.
Theory suggests that vertical integration may have a number of eﬃciency-
improving eﬀects that ultimately lower prices, improve product quality and
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increase consumer welfare (vertical integration increases information and
reduces transaction costs, eliminates double marginalisation, internalises
service and quality externalities),13 but in the Italian case the negative exclu-
sionary eﬀect will outweigh the eﬃciency eﬀects.
The recent acquisition by MEDIASET of the exclusive rights on DTT
to cover the soccer matches of Juventus, Milan and Inter (the teams with
the largest following in Serie A) for the next three years will further decrease
the opportunity to have a genuine competition in terrestrial TV in the
future. Only ownership separation between network provider and content
provider can reduce incentives for exclusionary behaviour and allow
genuine competition in the content market.
THE REFORM OF MEDIA OWNERSHIP RULES
The new media law 112/2004 changed the media ownership rules of Law
249/77 in a direction much more favourable direction to the main private
incumbent MEDIASET. The key political signiﬁcance of the change in rules
established by law 112 is that regulations have been calibrated to prevent
both RAI and MEDIASET being charged with passing the 30 per cent limit
of Law 249/97. The Italian antitrust has already started investigations
against RAI and MEDIASET for passing the limit.
The old limit prohibiting any company from owning more than 20 per
cent of total national networks, with a maximum of two, is replaced with
the rule prohibiting a company from owning more than 20 per cent of total
programmes broadcast by the digital terrestrial platform.14 This limit will
come into eﬀect when the frequency assignment plan is accomplished. The
number of broadcast programmes when the plan is achieved will be higher
than 36. Thus the limit of channels that a company will be able to broad-
cast will be at least seven. Today Rai and MEDIASET each own three
channels.
However, until the plan is implemented, there is another ownership limit
that replaces the Law 249 threshold of 30 per cent of market share of total
revenues of the sector to which the broadcaster (terrestrial, cable, satellite)
belongs. The new ownership limit is 20 per cent of total value of SIC (inte-
grated communication system) sector. This sector is the sum of the follow-
ing subsectors: press, trade directories, radio-television, movies, other
advertising, sponsorship, and so on.
Thetotalvalueof theSICsectorwasabout26billioneuros in2003.Twenty
per cent of this value is 5200 million euros; the total TV advertising market
was about 4123 million euros, and the total TV market was about 6165
million euros. A TV operator could be a monopolist in the TV advertising
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monopoly and still not exceed the 20 per cent limit of SIC value . It could also
have more than 85 per cent of the total private TV market and not exceed the
limit of 20 per cent of total SIC revenues. Such possibilities are made diﬃcult
by a more ﬂexible rule, that does not allow the establishment of dominance
in any of the submarkets that are part of the SIC.15
Law 112/2004 repeals the parts of Law 249/97 that establish antitrust
boundaries but states that the establishment of dominance is not allowed
in SIC and in any of the submarkets that are part of the SIC. It defers the
implementation of the rule to European competition law. Competition law
does not prohibit dominance in itself, but prevents abuse of dominance;
Law 112 prohibits dominance in itself in SIC markets. The criteria to assess
dominance are those set by European Competition law.
The European Commission’s deﬁnition of dominance (EC, 2002)
denies(section 3.1/75) that a share of 25 per cent must result in dominance;
a share higher than 50 per cent yields a rebuttable presumption dominance
and a share around 40 per cent makes dominance quite likely.16 In this last
case, proof of a dominant position must be supplemented by other struc-
tural factors. Law 112/04 speciﬁes such factors: level of barriers to entry,
degree of competition in the television market, degree of eﬃciency of the
ﬁrm, and other indices concerning the diﬀusion of TV programmes, of
media products, movies, and so on. Table 5.5 shows that RAI and MEDI-
ASET had a market share in the total TV sector, in the last three years,
higher than 30 per cent and lower than 40 per cent. Thus, if one considers
the total television market (one of the SIC subsectors) market share, in the
Commission’s decision making practice, gives no evidence of a single dom-
inant position must be proved. Therefore the proof of a dominant position
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Table 5.5 Broadcasters’ market shares of the total Italian television
market (%)
2001 2002 2003
RAI 42.2 41.8 39.5
RTI(MEDIASET) 34.9 34.0 34.3
Telepiù 11.8 12.8 6.8a
Stream/Sky Italia 3.8 4.4 12.2
Network 7 (Telecom) 1.4 1.3 1.6
Others 5.9 5.8 5.5
Note: a The Telepiù data refer only to the ﬁrst half of 2003.
Source: AGCOM, Act No. 326/04/CONS.
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by Mediaset and RAI must be supplemented by other structural factors.
On the other hand a possible and, I think, correct interpretation of Law 112
is that dominance must be computed with reference to relevant markets as
deﬁned by antitrust commissions. Traditionally the national antitrust
authority and the EU Commission have segmented the TV sector
into diﬀerent relevant markets. In case No. COMP/JV.37-21/03/2000 –
BSkyB/Kirch Pay TV, the Commission states (paragraph 25), ‘The fact that
subscribers are prepared to pay considerable sums for pay-TV indicates
that the latter is a distinguishable product with speciﬁc utility’. If we
exclude pay TV revenues from total revenues of the TV sector the market
share of the RAI is 47.6 per cent and that of MEDIASET 41.3 per cent.
On the other hand if we consider only the TV advertising market the share
of MEDIASET in 2003 was 64.4 per cent. Furthermore such share has
increased over time. Therefore MEDIASET share give evidence of a dom-
inant position. The share of RAI is 28.5 per cent and therefore there is also
a clear evidence of collective dominance17 by RAI and MEDIASET.
Law 112, from one angle, goes back to the concept of dominance in
European competition law, but is ambiguous in following the approach of
the European Commission in deﬁning the relevant market on which dom-
inance is computed. On the other hand, Law 112 does not take account that
the concept of dominance could include collective dominance. A recent
lawsuit clariﬁed that the expression ‘one or more undertakings’ in Article
82 of the EC Treaty means that a dominant position may be held by two or
more economic entities which are legally and economic independent of
each other (Papadias, 2004). In theory, this interpretation could allow the
actual structure of Italian TV sector to change. In practice a ﬁnding of col-
lective dominance is quite diﬃcult to prove.18 The conclusion of this section
is that, with Law 112, the Italian government has given up any attempt to
regulate media ownership.
THE ROLE OF THE PUBLIC BROADCASTER IN
THE DIGITAL ERA
The relaxation of spectrum scarcity does not necessarily ensure that pro-
grammes that are beneﬁcial for society as whole will be oﬀered, if they are
undervalued by individuals or generate external beneﬁt. A public broad-
caster could provide them. The question is whether the public broadcaster
should also oﬀer commercial programmes funded with advertising, rather
than solely education and information programmes funded by licence fees.
In Italy this latter model has been followed with results that were not con-
sidered satisfactory by the Antitrust commission.19 Programme diversity
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was too low, with the public broadcaster duplicating commercial pro-
grammes rather than serving special interest groups. The quality of pro-
gramming was low.
The excess of capacity in frequencies and plants has been one of the causes
that has blocked entry and has allowed the formation of a duopoly in Italy.
AGCM also found collusive behaviour between the public broadcaster
RAI and MEDIASET. A diﬀerent model with the RAI ﬁnanced only by
licence fees, broadcasting only two channels and freeing up parts of the
broadcast spectrum to increase the number of competitors might have been
a much more eﬃcient choice from a welfare point of view.
Law 112 does not change the organisational model of public broadcast-
ers and introduces a further complication: partial privatisation of the RAI.
There is a contradiction between the claim of the Italian government that
digital TV is a great opportunity for Italy which facilitates convergence of
the existing communications infrastructures (broadcasting, telecommuni-
cations and computer technology) and enhances competition across ser-
vices and platforms, and its defence of the role of the public broadcaster.
Government regulation of terrestrial television was generally premised on
the notion that the natural limitation of the electromagnetic spectrum
required careful government scrutiny of broadcasting in order to ensure
that this public resource was used to the beneﬁt of all. By using the spec-
trum more eﬃciently, digitalisation relaxes spectrum constraints on the
number of channels. Thus digital technology has revived questions about
the legitimate role of the state in regulating terrestrial broadcasting.20
Many social scientists think a market–based system will not work fully to
supply public interest programmes, and therefore there is ample room for
public TV. Such programmes must continue to be ﬁnanced by licence fees,
but there is no need for public TV to ﬁnance commercial programmes with
advertising resources. Digitalisation reduces, rather than increases, the need
for the public operator to broadcast commercial programmes. This is not
the approach of Law 112, which divides the public operator into two divi-
sions, one that will supply commercial programmes and will be ﬁnanced by
advertising and subscription, and one that will oﬀer public interest pro-
grammes and will be ﬁnanced by licence fees. The divisions will have sep-
arate budgets as Law 112 forbids use of resources from licence fees to fund
commercial programmes. AGCOM will monitor the public broadcaster’s
actions.21 This solution is not very eﬃcient. We have shown elsewhere (Del
Monte, 2004), analysing conﬁgurations of viewer preferences, that a DTT
is not necessarily a solution to market failure in the TV market and that a
public broadcaster could be required to satisfy speciﬁc programme types.
On the other hand we have shown that it is not eﬃcient for a public broad-
caster to produce commercial TV. The only eﬀect of the entry of a public
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broadcaster into commercial TV is to duplicate programme types and
therefore decrease total welfare.
A further important aspect of the Italian broadcast reform is the partial
privatisation of RAI. Partial privatisation will allow a reduction in the
public deﬁcit without central government losing control of the RAI. The
most probable scenario is the issue on the market of 30 per cent of
the shares of the RAI, but Law 112 places a limit on the maximum number
of shares that any private shareholder can own at no more than 1 per cent.
Agreements between private shareholders on the election of the members
of the boards of directors are also forbidden. The total number of seats is
nine: three are elected by private shareholders, four by the Italian parlia-
ment, and two by central government (through the Treasury). This distribu-
tion of seats allows the parliamentary majority easily to retain control of
the RAI.
The eﬀects of the new public governance arrangements of the RAI on
total welfare could also be studied starting from the results of the literature
on mixed markets. One of the results of this literature is that the eﬀect of
such a market structure on total welfare will depend very much on the
objective function and on the behaviour of the public ﬁrm. The literature
assumes that public ﬁrms maximise social welfare (the sum of consumer
surplus and proﬁts made by the ﬁrm) while private ﬁrms maximise their
own proﬁts. De Fraja and De Bono (1989) show that, in the context of a
quantity – setting oligopoly, welfare may be higher when a public ﬁrm is a
proﬁt maximiser rather than a welfare maximiser. Thus privatisation of
a public ﬁrm may improve welfare even without improving the eﬃciency of
the public ﬁrm. If on the other hand public ﬁrms maximise social welfare
the best result is reached, in terms of total welfare, when there is
Stackelberg competition and the public ﬁrm maximise the welfare as a
Stackelberg leader. The behaviour of the RAI and MEDIASET on the
Italian TV market have been more that of tacit collusion than Cournot
competition.22 Only in this last case is it possible to show (Baraldi, 2003)
that partial privatisation increases total welfare. In this case the public
company will maximise a weighted average of welfare and proﬁts. The only
possibility that the new corporate governance of the RAI will lead to an
increase in public welfare, following the mixed markets literature, is that
unlike in the past the RAI and MEDIASET will compete and not collude.
Thus, on the basis of the theoretical literature on mixed markets and an
analysis of meeting consumer preference, and in light of the past behaviour
of the RAI and MEDIASET, the choice of the Italian government on the
strategic role and corporate governance of the RAI will not improve
welfare.
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CONCLUSIONS
Our conclusion is that the future of digital television in Italy will be decided
by politics rather than technology. The Italian media laws are not capable
of increasing competition in the digital service markets. The goal of a gen-
uinely competitive market can be achieved only with structural regulation.
The main focuses of structural regulation policy have to be:
(a) ownership separation between network and content providers, at least
for digital terrestrial television;
(b) reassignment of frequencies to network providers in such a way as to
increase entry;
(c) complete privatisation of the commercial part of the RAI.
Without such interventions the classic rules of conduct regulation
(mandatory access to networks and content, and so on) will be unable to
foster competition at least in the DTT market. Rules of conduct may be
adequate in a country where there is competition between platforms.
Unfortunately the limited diﬀusion in Italy of platforms competitive with
DTT makes such rules inadequate.
In other countries the existence of established cable and satellite networks
facilitate the transition to DTT, since it becomes necessary for only a minor-
ity of the population to migrate to DTT. In Italy where analogue terrestrial
broadcasting is still predominant, the switchover process is very complex,
involving the replacement or upgrading of millions of TV receivers and the
replanning of thousands of transmitters. Without structural regulation the
transition to digital, if the switch date of 2006 is to be respected, will greatly
penalise consumers in terms of investment and subscription costs without
substantial advantages for new and better services. The alternative, more in
the tradition of Italian TV policy, will be to postpone the switch date without
substantial change in the structure of the TV industry.
NOTES
1. Pressure from the European Commission is not likely to have a great eﬀect on the struc-
ture of the Italian TV industry. Thus Levy (1999) shows that the analogue model of regu-
lation adopted in France, Germany and England has not been very greatly aﬀected by
EU level broadcasting regulations.
2. The Final Report of the Working Group on and Digital Territorial Television in EPRA
countries shows that in 2003 Italy had, 520 local terrestrial channels, Germany 50, the
UK 19, Sweden 0, Holland 115 and Finland 3.
3. Another major problem of the Italian television market was that while theoretically 12
licences were granted at national level, but some companies could not broadcast, because
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they did not have the frequencies required. Europa 7 is one of the companies that had
the licence but was unable to obtain frequencies at national level since they were occu-
pied by MEDIASET’s Channel 4.
4. Law 223, as all subsequent laws regulating the broadcasting industry in Italy, followed
the policy of imposing much tighter limits on advertising on the public than on private
broadcasters.
5. Surveys show that in Italy the audience of pay TV is diﬀerent from that of free-to-air
audience. The high income class represents 56.3 per cent of the total pay-TV audience,
and 37.7 per cent of the total TV audience.
6. Phillips Global Media.
7. Case N. Comp/ M. 2876- Newscorp-Telepiù 2/04/2003. The main obligations imposed
by the EU Commission were:
● Sky platform must grant all interested third party operators access under fair, trans-
parent, non-discriminatory and cost-oriented conditions.
● Sky will keep separate ﬁnancial accounts regarding its activities as a provider of tech-
nical services for each technical service separately.
● Access to Sky content to all interested third parties, at a fair reasonable and non-
discriminating basis, with a price based on retail minus-principle.
● Sky could bid for exclusive ﬁlm and sports rights only on DTH platforms.
● Sky must waive exclusive rights on ﬁlms and football matches on platforms other
than DTH.
● Sky must oﬀer Premium channels on a non-exclusive, non-discriminatory and
unbundled basis, based on retail minus principle to third parties that could distrib-
ute such programmes on platforms other than DTH.
● Sky must forgo entry in the DTT market.
8. The cable TV sector is not well developed in Italy. Fastweb has an optical-ﬁbre network
in Milan and Rome and it is expanding its infrastructure to other cities, but its coverage
is still limited. In June 2004 it had 151 000 TV subscribers. Fastweb is also a Telecom
operator and is able to oﬀer TV, broadband services and telephone services.
9. With one million DTT decoders sold, and about 700 000 prepaid cards sold by MEDI-
ASET and TV7, the pay-per-view market is still small.
10. Italy and Finland are the EU countries that have the earliest analogue switching date:
2006. But there is some doubt that Italy will be able to fulﬁl this timetable.
11. RAI could cover the same share of population and could oﬀer the same quality of ana-
logue services with less spectrum relative to the total it uses now.
12. The Cable industry is divided into a large number of distinct local markets, and cable
operators sell to consumers normally in an exclusive franchise area.
13. For a discussion of these eﬀects see Perry (1989).
14. The 20 per cent limit is lowered to 10 per cent for ﬁrms belonging to the telecommuni-
cation sector that command more than 40 per cent of telecommunication revenues. Only
one ﬁrm in the telecommunications market has such share, Telecom.
15. Law 112 proscribes until the year 2010 the acquisition or the start-up of newspapers by
TV broadcasters that own more than one channel at a national level.
16. The monitoring of the existence of dominance in SIC and in the single submarkets is
entrusted by Law 112 to the AGCOM.
17. ‘Indagine conoscitiva sul settore televisivo: la raccolta pubblicitaria’, p. 50, AGCM,
November 2003.
18. In the Italian case such proof is not so hard to seek: the head of the government which
controls the public broadcaster is also the owner of MEDIASET.
19. Indagine conoscitiva sulla raccolta pubblicitaria, AGCM, November 2004.
20. Armstrong and Weeds (2004) provides an exhaustive analysis of the role of public service
broadcasting in the digital world.
21. Armstrong and Weeds (2004) provide an exhaustive analysis of the role of public service
broadcasting in the digital world.
22. See op. cit. in Note 17.
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